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CASE NOTES
HOSPITAL RECORDS IN EVIDENCE.-The admissibility in evidence
of hospital reports of a patient's treatment, commonly known as
hospital records or charts, has been the subject of much confu-
sion among the courts. The conflicting opinions, and the reasons
advanced in support of them, vary beyond possible reconcilia-
tion. In many instances courts of the same jurisdiction have
alternately admitted, and excluded such evidence, without
clearly indicating the basis for their decisions. While it seems
that the weight of authority has been against the admission of
such records, the objections advanced against their competency
have not been altogether clear.
It is apparent, under common law principles, that such rec-
ords, if admissible at all, can only be allowed under the excep-
tion to the hearsay rule, commonly designated as regular entries
in the course of business. The first essential to avoid the hearsay
rule is that the witness be unavailable; in other words a neces-
sity for the introduction of this evidence must be clearly demon-
strated. To illustrate, in the case of Boss v. Illinois Central
Railroad Company' it was held that a refusal to allow the
introduction of a clinical record was error, where it appeared
that the nurse who had made the entries was deceased, and
where the record had been properly identified. On the other
hand, in the case of Osborne v. Grand Trunk Railway Company,2
it was said, "Assuming, but not deciding, that such a record
falls within the rule governing the admission of regular entries
upon the principle of necessity, that rule requires that the per-
son who made the entries 'must be unavailable as a witness,' "
and the exclusion of the hospital record in the trial court was
proper because the absence of the witnesses, nurses who kept the
record, was not accounted for.
It is not necessary at this point to go into further detail on
this essential. Since hospital records are usually the product of
more than one person, this principle can be more clearly illus-
trated in the discussion hereafter of cases involving personal
knowledge of the entrants, and "composite entries."
The second essential element in this exception to the hearsay
rule, is most aptly described as "the circumstantial guarantee
of trustworthiness, "3 by which it is meant that all circumstances
pertaining to the making of these records indicate the improb-
ability of falsity and safeguard their correctness. In the case
of Adler v. New York Life Insurance Company,4 the court up-
1221 111. App. 504 (1921).
287 Vt. 104, 88 A. 512 (1913).
S John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evi-
dence in Trials at Common Law (2d Ed.), III, secs. 1522 to 1530.
433 F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
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held the admission of hospital reports and the office records of
a physician, because they were the best available evidence and
in all probability represented truly the facts which they pur-
ported to show. The court stated that there was far less reason
to question the truthfulness of entries in such records than those
in books of account. In the latter, possibility of personal gain
might prompt dishonest entries, while in the former conscious
misstatement could hardly benefit in any way the one making the
record. A mistaken entry in a physician's record might result
in serious consequences, since the treatment of a patient depends
in a great measure upon the verity of such reports.
The trustworthiness of such record was questioned in the
case of National Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Cox'
on the ground that they were mere private memoranda, and
could only be made use of to refresh the memory of the wit-
nesses, if they had been present. Similarly, in the case of Kemp
v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company,6 a hospital record was
held incompetent, because it was not kept by a public officer as
part of his duties, and therefore not a public record.
In re Hock's Will7 held to the same effect, saying that such
records were not entitled to be regarded as public records.
However, the court stated that it would be proper to use them
to refresh the memory of a testifying physician, although he
had no independent memory of the facts recorded therein.
In these decisions the courts seemed to overlook the fact that
it was not essential that records or books be part of an industrial
or mercantile occupation to be regular entries in the course of
business, nor that they be official public records to be admissible
in evidence. In many of our earlier cases, such records as a
ship's log-book," a notary's records,9 a lawyer's record-book of
proceedings in a cause,' 0 a register of marriages or the like kept
by priests," none of which were public records, were admitted in
evidence, as regular entries in the course of business.
In Ribas v. Revere Rubber Company,12 one of the grounds for
the rejection of a hospital record by the trial court was that it
was not a public record, but merely a private memorandum, kept
for the convenience and assistance of attending doctors and
nurses. In reversing this decision, the supreme court of the
state held that because the record was not required by law did
5174 Ky. 683, 192 S. W. 636 (1917).
6 94 App. Div. 322, 88 N. Y. S. 1 (1904).
7 74 Misc. 15, 129 N. Y. S. 196 (1911).
8 Barber v. Holmes, 3 Esp. 190, 170 Eng. Rep. 583 (1800).
) Sasscer v. The Farmers Bank, 4 Md. 409 (1853).
10 Leland v. Cameron, 31 N. Y. 115 (1865).
11 Kennedy v. Doyle, 92 Mass. 161 (1865).
12 37 R. 1. 189, 91 A. 58 (1914).
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not make it inadmissible. It was sufficient that the record was
kept in the regular course of business.
The opinion of the court in the case of Globe Indemnity Com-
pany v. Reinhart13 embodies, perhaps, the best reasons for the
trustworthiness of hospital records. The court said: "So far
as the hospital is concerned, there could be no more important
record than the chart which indicates the diagnosis, the condi-
tion, and treatment of the patients. . . . Upon this record the
physician depends in large measure to indicate and guide him
in the treatment of any given case. Long experience has shown
that the physician is fully warranted in depending upon the
reliability and trustworthiness of such a record. It is difficult
to conceive why this record should not be reliable. There is no
motive for the person, whose duty it is to make the entries, to
do other than record them correctly and accurately. On the
other hand, there is the strongest reason why he should: First,
because of the great responsibility, he knowing that the treat-
ment of the patient depends largely upon this record, and, if it
be incorrect, it may result, and probably will result, in the pa-
tient's failure to receive proper surgical or medical treatment,
which failure might be followed by serious consequences or even
death. Second, the entrant must realize and appreciate that his
position is dependent upon the accuracy with which the record
is made. Third, as was stated by Tindall, C. J., in Poole v.
Dicas, 1 Bing. (N. C.) 649: 'It is easier to state what is true than
what is false; the process of invention implies trouble in such
a case unnecessarily incurred.' "
The final probative element of this, as of all evidence, is that
the entry be based upon personal knowledge or observation.
This does not necessarily mean that the entrant himself have per-
sonal knowledge of the facts recorded. A physician, for example,
making observations of a patient's condition, dictates these ob-
servations to a nurse, who records them.
Among the difficult questions which arise are the following:
(a) In the absence of the physician, may the record be admitted
in evidence upon verification by the nurse? (b) In the absence
of both the nurse and the physician can the records be admitted
upon verification by the custodian of the records? (c) Where
physicians, nurses, and internes each make individual entries
upon their own observations, is the presence of all the entrants
necessary to verify the record, or is it sufficient that the custo-
dian or supervisor verify it ?
To attempt to lay down one principle to govern all of these
situations would be impossible. The attitudes of the courts, even
in the same jurisdiction, vary so greatly, that it would be ex-
tremely difficult to say what result would follow in a given
13 152 Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927).
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case. The rulings of the courts may be divided into four distinct
classes, each of which will be reviewed.
(1) A number of courts, upon the sound consideration that
it is practically impossible under present-day mercantile condi-
tions to produce all of the individuals who reported or recorded
the transactions, have assumed the liberal and practical attitude
of admitting such records verified by one person who knew them
to be regular entries kept in the establishment, without requiring
that the original observers be produced or even accounted for.
The Minnesota case of Lund v. Olson et al.14 is in point. In
this case a hospital chart was admitted over objections that it
was a self-serving declaration on the part of the plaintiff and
was hearsay. One of the surgeons of the injured person identi-
fied the original record. He testified that the record contained
what had transpired during the plaintiff's stay in the hospital,
reports of his pulse, temperature, and matters relative to his
condition and treatment; that it was kept by two nurses in
charge, each making her individual entries; that the surgical
notes were made by the surgical nurse as dictated by the operat-
ing surgeon and signed by him; that those making the entries
were authorized to do so; and that the entire record was made
according to the usual course of business in the hospital. The
upper court sustained the admission of the record.
In the New Hampshire case of St. Louis v. Boston and Maine
Railroad,5 the defense counsel objected to the admission of hos-
pital records, on the ground that records of this kind are not com-
petent unless identified by the people who made them, or unless
the absence of those persons is accounted for. The upper court
held that their admission was error, because at the time of the
trial the verifying witness, a former superintendent of the hospi-
tal, had not been connected with the institution for two years;
because she had never had charge of the records; and because
they had never been in her custody. However, the court said,
"It is undeniably true that where modern business methods are
employed, some modification of the old rule governing the proof
of entries made in the regular course of business is demanded.
.. In most instances of records inscribed by various persons the
production of one verifying witness should be sufficient . . ."
The court further stated that if the records had been verified
by the proper person, they would have been rendered admissible.
In Ribas v. Revere Rubber Company,'6 the defense attempted
to introduce a hospital record to show that as a result of the
patient's unruly behavior and disobedience to the orders of the
attending physician and nurses a fractured bone failed to knit
14 182 Minn. 204, 234 N. W. 310, 75 A. L. R. 371 (1931).
15 83 N. H. 538, 145 A. 263 (1929).
16 37 R. I. 189, 91 A. 58 (1914).
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properly. This record was kept by an interne, the recording
official, and contained not only matters which came within his
personal knowledge, but also matters which were reported to him
by doctors and nurses connected with the case. The plaintiff
objected to the admission of the records, because some of the
facts recorded were not within the personal knowledge of the
entrant, and because the facts reported by others to the interne
were capable of proof by those persons, who might have been
called as witnesses. In sustaining the admission of the record,
the Rhode Island court decided that the lack of personal knowl-
edge of the entrant was not sufficient to exclude it as evidence,
and that where in the regular course of business, one person re-
cords an oral or written report made to him by another of a
transaction lying in the personal knowledge of the latter, there
is no objection to receiving the record verified by the former.
(2) The rulings of the courts which come within the second
class admit such records where they are verified by the person
who made them after it is shown that the original observer is
unavailable because of death, insanity, illness or absence from
the jurisdiction.
In Globe Indemnity Company v. Reinhart,17 the defendant
sought to introduce a hospital record for the purpose of showing
that the injured person was delirious on a certain day. The
chart nurse testified that she had, in the regular course of her
duties, made the entries from reports furnished her by the
attendant nurse. When it was established that the attendant
nurse was out of the jurisdiction, the court admitted the record
as verified by the chart nurse.
On the other hand, in the Illinois case of Wright v. Upson
et al.'s it was held to be error on the part of the trial court to
admit a hospital record made by several nurses, where only one
nurse verified it, and it was not shown that the others were
deceased or out of the jurisdiction.
In the case of Kimber v. Kimber et al., 19 which followed the
case of Wright v. Upson, the admission of a hospital record was
objected to because some of the notations on it were made by
the internes and nurses, and not by the physician who testified.
In sustaining the objection the court stated that since hospital
records are admissible only upon the same basis as books of
17 152 Md. 439, 137 A. 43 (1927).
1s303 I1. 120, 135 N. E. 209 (1922).
19317 I1. 561, 148 N. E. 293 (1925). It may be worthy to note the liberal
attitude of the same court in the case of People v. Small et al., 319 Inl. 437, 150
N. E. 435 (1926), where the books of account of a large bank were admitted
in evidence upon verification by the cashier, who had no personal knowledge
of the entries, without producing the considerable number of clerks who made
entries therein, and without showing that they were even unavailable as
witnesses.
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account, the same character of proof is required, that is, that
all persons making entries must testify to their correctness.
(3) In the third class of rulings, the courts have excluded
hospital records because the original observer was in no way
accounted for, without declaring what excuse, if any, would be
sufficient for his non-production. Some of these courts have
intimated that even if he were produced, such records would be
incompetent.
An excellent example of such a ruling is the case of Baird v.
Reilly.20 Here, that portion of the record in which the entries
were made by the attending nurse, was excluded on the ground
that she had not been called as witness. There was dictum to
the effect that if she were present to testify, the record would
be competent only to refresh her memory.
Similarly, in the case of Harkness v. Borough of Swissvale,21
it was held that a hospital record, identified by the superinten-
dent as being in the handwriting of a physician and nurse
attached to the institution, was properly excluded. This court
also stated that if the doctor had been present, this record could
have been used only to refresh his memory. Of course, this
statement was not necessary for the decision.
(4) A few courts, entirely disregarding the principle of neces-
sity, have excluded such records where the absence of the origi-
nal observer was accounted for, declining on any grounds to
excuse non-production of the witness.
It was held in Dougherty v. Kalbach22 that the admission of
a hospital record without an opportunity to examine the physi-
cians by whom the record was made was reversible error, even
though these physicians were shown to be absent from the juris-
diction.
In the recent case of Paxos v. Jarka Corporation , 23 the admis-
sion of a hospital record by the trial court was held to be revers-
ible error, in spite of the fact that the physicians and internes
who made the entries were shown to be out of the jurisdiction.
The court stated that there were three probative elements to be
fulfilled in order to avoid the hearsay rule and that the record
met the first two requirements, in that they were made contem-
poraneously with the events recorded, and there was no apparent
motive to falsify. However, the third essential element, that of
personal knowledge on the part of the entrant was not satisfied.
The court stated that the testimony of a doctor as to the extent
2092 F. 884, 35 C. C. A. 78 (1899).
21238 Pa. 544, 86 A. 478 (1913).
See Levy v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 143 App. Div. 7, 127 N. Y. S. 506
(1911); Job v. Grand Trunk Western Railway Company, 245 Mich. 353, 222
N. W. 723 (1929).
22 175 N. Y. S. 837 (1919).
23 314 Pa. 148, 171 A. 468 (1934).
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of injuries, is primarily opinion evidence, and when in court,
he is subjected to severe examination to test the accuracy, sound-
ness and truth of his opinion. To deny the opposition the right
to test the witnesses' knowledge and qualifications, the court
held, was to deny it a substantial right. However, the court con-
tinued, "We do not wish to be understood as holding that in no
case can hospital records be produced, but, except in extraordi-
nary cases and then only where the three probative elements are
present, such records should not be received in evidence."
In Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Quinn,24 a hospital
chart verified by the superintendent of nurses, and another nurse
who made entries thereon, was held not admissible, because it
contained notations made by a nurse who was not present at the
trial but who was shown to be available. This court, while recog-
nizing the existence of the principle of necessity, showed no fa-
miliarity with its application.
In the discussion thus far, it has been attempted to cover
those essentials necessary for admitting hospital records in evi-
dence, under the principle of regular entries in the course of
business. From this point, the discussion will cover such objec-
tions, based upon independent rules of evidence, as attack the
substance of the records rather than the records as a whole
as regular entries. Hospital records, being the testimonial asser-
tions of the entrant or the original observer are, so far as appli-
cable, subject to the rules of impeachment, which apply to all
testimonial evidence.
In Reed v. Hensel,25 a portion of a hospital record known as
the history of the case, consisted of a statement by the injured
person's daughter which read: "Plaintiff struck by automobile
while crossing street. Unconscious for a time, but no subse-
quent return of unconsciousness. For many years has had at-
tacks of Meniere's disease with associated severe headaches and
short attacks of irrationality. Hearing in right ear has been
poor. Since accident, cannot bear with either ear." This por-
tion of the record was properly excluded on the ground that
it was hearsay.
As in the previous case, it was held in Dunn v. Buschmann26
to be reversible error to admit a hospital record, a considerable
portion of which was obviously hearsay.
In the case of Globe Indemnity v. Reinhart, previously cited,
the court stated that it did not wish to be understood as holding
that everything in a hospital record would be proper in evidence.
"The chart being presented," the court said, "if its contents
24 11 D. L. R. 600, Rop. Jud. Quebec 22 K. B. 428 (1913).
25 26 Ohio App. 79, 159 N. E. 843 (1927).
Also see The Western Electric Company v. The Industrial Commission, et aL.,
349 Ill. 139, 181 N. E. 638 (1932).
26 169 Wash. 395, 13 P. (2d) 69 (1932).
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
upon examination would be open to other objections, such as
immateriality, irrelevancy, or that it was an expression of opin-
ion by persons not competent to express an opinion, these objec-
tions are not precluded by what we have here said."
Statutes in certain jurisdictions make hospital records privi-
leged communications, inadmissible in evidence. An illustration
appears in the Washington case of Toole v. Franklin Investment
Company.27 In that jurisdiction a statute provides that a phy-
sician may not, without the consent of his patient, disclose any
information that he might acquire in attending that person. The
court held that hospital records, so far as they tended to disclose
what the physician had learned through his care of the patient,
were protected under that statute.
However, in the Missouri case of Galli v. Wells28 it was held
that a hospital record was admissible, since the plaintiff, having
taken the stand and testified as to her physical condition, and
having called her physician to testify on the same subject,
waived the statutory privilege.
While it has been the purpose here to determine whether or
not hospital records are admissible in evidence on common law
principles, it is worthy of note that a number of jurisdictions
have by statute made such records admissible. A statute which
deserves universal sanction is that of Massachusetts. A pertinent
part of that statute reads, "Records kept by hospitals under
section seventy of chapter one hundred and eleven shall be ad-
missible as evidence in the courts of the commonwealth so far
as such records relate to the treatment and medical history of
such cases; but nothing therein contained shall be admissible
as evidence which has reference to the question of liability.''29
It is disappointing to note that such little knowledge and so
much confusion has been demonstrated by a number of courts
on the admissibility of such important evidence as hospital rec-
ords.
In view of the purposes for which these records are admitted
into evidence, the underlying principles of the hearsay rule are
not violated. They are not allowed to prove matters of opinion
or liability for the injury, but stand merely as specific evidence
of the condition of the patient-the absolute facts of physical
manifestation. For that reason, they should be considered ad-
missible because they probably are true, as any record made in
the regular course of business by persons with no motive for
falsifying the entries.
N. M. AUsTIN
27 158 Wash. 696, 291 P. 1101 (1930).
28209 Mo. App. 460, 239 S. W. 894 (1922).
29 (1932). Tercentenary Edition of The General Laws of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, Vol. 2, Chapter 233, section 79. See also Vol. 1, Chapter
111, section 70; Vol. 2, Chapter 152, section 20.
